

*Does Cash Flow Really Matter for  
Corporate Investment Decisions?*

*Long ago and far away...*

- Long-observed relationship between corporate investment and cash flow:
  - Fisher (Econom., 1933); Gurley and Shaw (AER, 1955); Meyer and Kuh (1957).
- *Prima-facie* evidence of financing constraints.
- Motivated capital rationing literature ('BODs'):
  - Charnes et al. (JB, 1959); Baumol and Quandt (EJ, 1965); Myers (JF, 1972), Weingartner (JF, 1977).

## *An economics-inspired takeover*

- Modigliani-Miller insights and perfect/efficient markets paradigm lead to a sea change in thinking:
  - A project's 'worth' is determined solely by its NPV. Financing considerations, including the firm's cash reserves, are irrelevant.
  - All 'good' projects receive funding.
- Capital rationing discussions begin to be relegated to little more than a footnote in textbooks.
- What about the empirical relationship between investment and cash flow? 'Explained' as emanating either from:
  - cash flow a proxy for profitability and investment opportunities; or
  - agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, JFE 1976)  $\Rightarrow$  overinvestment!

## *The counter-revolution*

- Corporate finance theory during the 1980s began to emphasize the sensitivity of the M-M paradigm to market imperfections and the role of these in *constraining* firms' access to funds, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (AER, 1981), Greenwood et al. (AER, 1984), Myers and Majluf (JFE, 1984).
- Empirical support provided by Fazzari et al. (BPEA, 1988)
  - found that 'more constrained' firms had greater investment-cash flow sensitivity
  - ⇒ positive relationship between investment and cash flow is evidence of financing constraints.

*And more...*

- Other studies found similar results across a wide range of investment 'types', e.g., R&D, inventories, labour.
- Objection: Q not adequately controlling for investment opportunities.
  - but 'natural experiment' studies found same results when cash flow shocks clearly independent of investment opportunities, e.g., Lamont (JF, 1997), Blanchard et al. (JFE, 1994), Froot and O'Connell (NBER, 1997).

## *The great debate*

- Kaplan and Zingales (QJE, 1997)
  - no theoretical reason for investment-cash flow sensitivity to monotonically increase in constraints;
  - FHP firms that are most constrained exhibit *lower* sensitivities than less constrained firms.
  
- Ensuing debate (FHP, QJE 2000; KZ, QJE 2000) centred on disagreements over
  - theoretical conditions for monotonicity;
  - appropriateness of KZ data sample (but see Cleary, JF 1999);
  - definition of 'financially constrained'.



## *An uneasy truce*

- Acceptance that the different findings of FHP and KZ at least partly reflect their different classification systems: frictions proxies versus financial strength indices.
- But not clear why.
- Subsequent work has focussed on refining and clarifying this state of affairs.
  - is the investment-cash flow relationship explained by financing constraints, or agency problems, or even something else entirely (Microsoft conundrum)?

## *Consolidation?*

- Studies of theoretical underpinnings have tended to muddy the waters
  - Altı (JF, 2003): can get FHP-type results in frictionless markets;
  - Boyle & Guthrie (JF, 2003): can get KZ-type results in presence of a binding financing constraint.
- Cleary et al. (JFQA, 2007): U-shaped relationship between investment and cash flow.
- Bushman et al. (2007): sensitivity insignificant under alternative measure of cash flow.
- Chen & Chen (2009): investment-cash flow sensitivity has disappeared!



## *The way forward...*

- Dynamic considerations - firm faces other constraints that may stop it using cash immediately.
- Reverse causality and second-order effects: the impact of investment on cash flow.
  - ordering of investment.